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STATUTORY (FORMERLY NON-STATUTORY) FRINGE
BENEFITS: New § 132*
By
Jerry J. McCoy
I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Non-cash fringe benefits of various types have grown significantly in recent
years as a proportion of the total compensation package. The number of
statutory rules provided for specific fringe benefits increased steadily in the
1970's until finally the Tax Reform Act of 1984 created the first comprehensive
statutory scheme to govern the tax consequences of all incidental fringe
benefits. These fringes were formerly identified as "nonstatutory fringe bene-
fits" due to their diverse nature, which appeared to render them incapable of
statutory definition. Despite this, these now have an Internal Revenue Code
provision, section 132.
The incidental fringe benefit rules in section 132 appear to have been
formulated largely with a view toward the large corporate employer and the
non-shareholder employee. Application of the resultant structure to closely-
held businesses, where the major fringe benefits are enjoyed by dominant
owners and their families, raise different considerations.
This paper will review the current statutory framework for taxation of fringe
benefits, including the proposed regulations under section 132, and examine
some of the special implications those rules have for employees of closely-held
corporations and other businesses.
A. History
Many of the governing principles in this area originated with ancient rulings
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In 1920, in O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920), the
Bureau ruled that supper money paid to employees who worked late on their
employer's business was not taxable to them. The issue framed by the Bureau
was whether these amounts were "income" of the sort subject to tax. The
answer was that these items were not taxable, because these payments were for
the convenience of the employer. The following year, in O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110
(1921), the Bureau ruled on the taxability of railroad passes provided to
employees and their families by railroad companies; the holding this time was
that the amounts in question were not taxable on grounds they represented gifts
to the employees. The reasoning in this ruling may be obsolete, but the result
remains the same in most cases, even today. Beyond the actual holdings,
however, these old rulings demonstrated something else, for they set a prec-
edent for the handling of these items. In general, noncash fringe benefits were
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simply ignored. They were taxed (or more accurately, were not taxed) largely
on the basis of unwritten, administration practice and custom.
Over the years, statutory rules were adopted for a number of particular types
of fringe benefits. A partial list of these would be as follows:
Group Term Life Insurance (§ 79)
Reimbursed Moving Expenses (§§ 82 and 217)
Medical Reimbursement Plans (§ 105)
Meals or Lodging Furnished for the Convenience of the Employer (§ 119)
Qualified Group Legal Services Plans (§ 120)
Qualified Employer-Provided Transportation (§ 124)
Cafeteria Plans (§ 125)
Dependent Care Assistance Programs (§ 129)
Qualified Pension, Profit-Sharing, Etc. Plans (§ 401 et. seq.)
But for the basic run-of-the-mill fringe benefit, such as the company car, free
travel and the like, there was no statutory guidance, and the regulations added
very little. As a result, a large amount of dollar value passed from employers to
employees free of tax.
B. Economic Effect
A major tax saving, or economic gain, arises if an employer pays an expense
enjoyed by an employee. An employee must earn more than $1.00 to have a
$1.00 left over after taxes to spend on a particular item. At the 50% top bracket,
the employee must earn $2.00 to net $1.00 after taxes. The former amount was
even higher when Federal income tax rates rose as high as 70% or 92%. If the
item in question is deducted, and the employee spends this $1.00 on the item,
his net after-tax cost is $.50. However, if the employer pays it as a fringe
benefit, there was (formerly) usually no cost to the employee (because items of
this sort slipped through the system without detection in many cases). Even if
the amount in question was included in the employee's income, the only cost to
the employee would be the tax on this amount. And if the item is deductible, it
doesn't matter to the employee whether it is taxable or not.
This put a lot of pressure on employers to secure for their employees benefits
of this sort. This was especially so in a small corporation, where the employees'
interests tend to be closer to those of the employer. All of these factors made
this the sort of area that attracted the interest and attention of the Internal
Revenue Service.
C. Pre-1984 Developments
The modem era in fringe benefit taxation began in 1975, when the Internal
Revenue Service came up with the first set of regulations designed to deal
definitively with the taxability of miscellaneous non-cash fringe benefits.
These were published in the Federal Register as a "discussion draft," and they
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did indeed spark considerable discussion. Even though these proposed rules
were fairly generous as a general matter, they caused great excitement in the tax
world. Eventually, in December of 1976, Treasury Secretary Simon announced
(in his last full month on the job) that the draft fringe benefit regulations were
being withdrawn.
Subsequently, Congress began to play an active role in this area. Acting out
of concern that the Internal Revenue Service still harbored plans to make an
administrative move toward taxing fringe benefits, Congress passed in 1978 the
first moratorium on the issuance of final regulations on this subject. This
legislation forbade the Internal Revenue Service from issuing final regulations
on the subject before 1980. Subsequently, in 1979, the moratorium was
extended until 1981. Thereafter, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
extended the moratorium again, this time to December 31, 1983. Along the
way, the Treasury Department prepared some revised draft regulations on the
subject in 1981, as a sort of trial balloon. These regulations were never
officially issued, presumably due to the moratorium.
Congress began consideration of a comprehensive statute dealing with
non-cash fringe benefits in 1983, and in the following year, in Rev. Proc.
84-14, the Internal Revenue Service announced a voluntary moratorium,
promising it would not promulgate rules before 1985. Finally, as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1984, the first statute on this subject was enacted, generally
effective January 1, 1985.
Throughout the period just described, the actual taxation of fringe benefits
existed in a sort of limbo. The old rules (which lacked clarity and definiteness)
continued to be applicable without new administrative guidance. Taxpayers
were understandably nervous, since the Internal Revenue Service obviously
had its eye on fringe benefits. This period was thus marked by an abundance of
activity, with no real action.
II. INCIDENTAL FRINGE BENEFIT TAX RULES (§ 132)
Section 132, which took effect January 1, 1985, provides exclusions for four
categories of incidental fringe benefits, as described below. The 1984 Act,
which created section 132, also added the term "fringe benefits" to the
categories of compensation includible in gross income under section 61. Thus,
any fringe benefit not excludible under section 132 (or another Code provision)
will be included in gross income for income tax purposes.
The purpose of this statute was to end all the prior uncertainty. Like any new
statute, however, this one brought primarily a new and unfamiliar uncertainty.
It should be noted that the most vexing problem of all in many cases is valuation
of fringe benefits, and section 132 provides no help on this score. Thus, even if
taxpayers and their advisors are able to find peace with the new rules them-
selves, this field is likely to be a continuing source of controversy, at least from
a valuation standpoint.
It is worth nothing, however, that the Internal Revenue Service has provided
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some help on valuation. The temporary regulations under the 1984 amendment
to section 61 do address the problem in some context. See, for example, Temp.
Regs. § 1.61-2T, providing rules for employee-provided automobiles, com-
muting uses of vehicles, flights on employee planes, and free or discounted
commercial airline flights, respectively.
A. No-Additional-Cost Service Exclusion (§ 132(b))
1. General Rule
An employer-provided service may be excluded by an em-
ployee if -
a. The service is offered for sale to customers during the
ordinary course of the line of business of the employer in which
the employee works, and
b. The employer incurs no substantial additional cost (in-
cluding foregone revenue) in providing the service to the em-
ployee (without regard to amounts the employee pays for the
service).
2. Specific Problem Areas
a. Line of Business Restriction-The classic example is an
employer operating both an airline and a hotel; such an employer may not
provide excludible air travel to hotel employees and vice versa. Managerial,
accounting, and similar personnel may render services which directly benefit
more than one line of business; if so, they may exclude value of services from
all lines of businesses benefitted.
Special Election-By December 31, 1985, a multi-line business
may elect to continue providing excludible no-additional-cost services and
qualified employee discount fringe (see below) to all employees of all lines of
business in existence as of January 1, 1984. A 30% excise tax applies to excess
fringe benefits. See section 4977 and Temp. Reg. § 54.4977-1T (1/2/85); an
original March 31, 1985 deadline was extended to December 31, 1985 by IRB
85-31.
b. Reciprocal Arrangements-An employee may exclude no-
additional-cost fringes provided by another employer pursuant to a bona fide
reciprocal agreement. Thus, for example, employees of Pan Am may exclude
free flights on United if the two airlines enter into such an agreement. Where an
agreement is in effect, the services in question are treated as provided by the
employee's own employer, and must meet all the other applicable tests.
c. Discrimination-The no-additional-cost exclusion is avail-
able to officers, owners and highly-compensated employees only if the benefit
is made available on a nondiscriminatory basis. Under the Temporary Regu-
lations (§ 1.132-iT, Q12), a "highly-compensated" employee is one whose
compensation exceeds that of 90% of all employees, except that (1) any
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employee who is paid over $50,000 for a year is highly compensated, and (2) no
one paid $20,000 or less is highly compensated unless no employee is paid over
$35,000.
B. Qualified Employee Discount Exclusion
1. General Rule
An employee may exclude a discount on services or property
(other than real property and investment property) of the sort offered for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the line of business of the employer in
which the employee works. The amount of this exclusion is limited to the
employer's gross profit percentage in the case of property, and 20% of the
ordinary selling price in the case of services.
2. Specific Problem Area
a. Line of Business Limitation-This limitation is the same as
for no-additional-cost service (described supra), except (1) a special grand-
father rule is provided for affiliated groups which include a department store
operation, where non-store employees had department store discount privileges
as of October 5, 1983; (2) another special rule is provided for leased sections of
a department store which allows employees, in effect, to treat the entire store as
a single line of business; and (3) there is no reciprocal agreement rule.
Note: The special election, to be made by multi-line businesses
by December 31, 1985, does apply. See II. A. 2. a., supra.
b. Discrimination-The qualified employee discount exclu-
sion is available with respect to officers, owners and highly-compensated
employees only if the benefit is made available on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Rules here are the same as for the no-additional-cost service exclusion, as
described above.
C. Working Condition Fringes
1. General Rule
An employee may exclude from income the value of any
property or services provided by his/her employer to the extent that, if the
employee paid for the property or services directly, the payments would be
deductible under sections 162 or 167. For example, payment of bar association
dues by a law firm/employer would be excludible as a working condition
fringe.
Under section 132(h) (4), the term "working condition fringe"
specifically includes parking provided to an employee on or near the em-
ployer's business premises, without regard to deductibility under section 162.
2. Specific Problem Areas
a. Use of Company Car or Plane-Such items are excludible as
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a working condition fringe only if and to the extent used for business purposes.
However, incidental personal use may be excludible as a de minimis fringe
(discussed below).
b. Valuation of Auto Use-Taxability is generally determined
under the "annual lease value" tables in Temporary Regs. § 1.61-2T. These
figures are based upon the fair market value of the car, and seek to approximate
the annual cost of leasing the car under a four-year lease including maintenance
and insurance. Other costs (e.g., fuel, driver, tolls, etc.) are not included and
must be separately taken into account.
c. Optional Daily Rate for Commuting-An employee who is
not an officer or a 1% owner of the employer (5% between 1/ 1/85 and 3/22/85),
and who is using a vehicle subject to an employer policy that he or she may
make personal use of it only for commuting or other de minimis purposes, may
elect to value the personal use at a flat $3 per day.
D. De Minimis Fringes
1. General Rule
An employee may exclude from income the value of any
property or service which has the value (taking into account the frequency with
which similar fringes are provided) so small as to make accounting for it
unreasonable or administratively impractical. A typical example would be
occasional personal use of an employer's photocopy machine.
2. Subsidized Eating Facility
An eating facility located on or near the employer's business
premises will be treated as an excludible de minimis fringe if the revenue from
the facility normally equals or exceeds its direct operating cost. While the
non-discrimination rules are not generally applicable for de minimis fringes,
they are applicable in the case of such eating facilities.
E. On-Premises Gyms and Other Athletic Facilities
A separate exclusion is provided under section 132(h) (5) for the
value of a gym or other athletic facility operated by the employer on the
employer's premises, provided substantially all the use of the facility is by the
employees and their spouses and dependent children. The non-discrimination
rules are not applicable to these benefits.
III. SPECIFIC FRINGES
A. Below-Market Rate Loans
Another provision enacted by the 1984 Act, new section 7872,
attempts to deal comprehensively with a growing taxpayer abuse-the below-
market rate loan. The statute takes the simple tack of recharacterizing such
loans as market rate loans. The foregoing interest is deemed paid to the lender
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by the borrower, and the borrower will generally receive a deduction for this
amount. The same amount is deemed paid over to the borrower from the lender
and characterized according to the context involved. In the case of an employ-
ment relationship, this amount would be treated as compensation.
If the loan in question is a demand loan, the tax treatment is basically
as outlined above. Under these circumstances, the result is a "wash" for the
employee, with an income inclusion and a deduction in offsetting amounts. The
only exception would be the requirement that FICA and FUTA taxes be taken
into account. On the other hand, there can be mismatching if the loan is a term
loan; under these circumstances, the constructive interest amount is includible
in the employee's income in the year in which the loan was made, but the
offsetting deductions are allowed rateably over the term.
Subject to these wrinkles, the interest-free or low-interest loan can
work fine as a modem fringe benefit.
B. Employer-Provided Automobiles
The major fringe benefit for most small businesses is the company
car. Application of the new fringe benefit rules and other 1984 Act rules to the
company car provides an instructive example of how the rules work.
Initially, two of the new rules in section 132 are potentially appli-
cable. First, and most important, the "working condition fringe" rules of
section 132(d) apply to exclude the value of the car if and to the extent that the
employee could have deducted this item if he/she had paid for it directly.
Second, and less important, is the de minimis fringe exclusion under
section 132(e). Items with a small value which are too small to justify
accounting for them individually can be excluded under this rule. In the case of
a car, it would most frequently be applied to provide an exclusion for the
occasionally personal use made of a car primarily devoted to business uses.
The working condition fringe rules are designed to place the em-
ployee who is given a car to use on the same basis for tax purposes as one who
buys a car for business use. This would seem calculated to take our inquiry into
another murky tax area-the so-called "luxury car" rules of section 280F and
the related limitations on personal use of "listed property" in the same Code
provision. However, the temporary regulations provide that section 280F is not
applicable in determining the amount of the working condition fringe exclu-
sion. (See Temp. Regs. § 1.132-IT, Q/A5.) The example given in that
regulation shows how we approach the subject. Assume that an employee has
available for a full year a car with a fair market value of $28,000, and the car is
used entirely for business (i. e., there is no personal use). We proceed initially to
the section 61 temporary regulations where we find, at section
1.61-2T(Q/A13), a table of annual lease values. For a $28,000 car, the annual
lease value is $7,750. Section 280F normally limits automobile depreciation or
recovery deductions to $4,000 for the first year and $6,000 per year thereafter
for the balance of the recovery period. As a result, our employee could not
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deduct more than $6,000 in any one year ($4,000 in the first year) under section
167. Moreover, the exclusion for a working condition fringe is available only to
the extent the employee could deduct the amount himself if he paid for it
himself. Nevertheless, even though our annual lease value is $7,750, and the
section 167 deduction could not exceed $6,000, the regulations excuse this, and
provide that the value of the car is excludible in full on these facts.
Thus, employees and their tax advisors find their lives greatly
simplified, as they avoid the luxury automobile rules and the listed property
(mixed personal and business use) rules, both prescribed under section 280F.
However, several things should be noted about this. First, while the regulations
provide in effect that section 280F is not to be read into secton 132, they
specifically remind taxpayers that this aspect of the matter does not affect the
applicability of section 280F to the employer. Thus, on the facts posed above,
the employer who owns the car in question cannot deduct more than the $4,000
or $6,000 deduction otherwise allowable. Moreover, all of the other limitations
of section 280F apply to the employer's deduction. Second, the assumption
above was that the car was used entirely for business. This is typically not
realistic, as most company cars do experience commuting or family usage.
Those amounts would not be deductible under section 167 in any event,
notwithstanding section 280F. Accordingly, the value of these nonconforming
uses would fall out of the exclusion for working condition fringes.
Finally, the deduction limitation rules of section 274 apply to this
situation. Thus, the substantiation quandary is apparently a problem which the
employee must be prepared to face. Presumably, he/she must maintain records
or other "sufficient evidence" to corroborate his/her own statement about the
business use of the car. The 1984 Act included an obscure provision changing
the substantiation rules of section 274 to require adequate contemporaneous
records for cars and all similar "listed property." When the taxpaying world
learned of this, a great hue and cry went up, since many taxpayers had become
accustomed to living with rough approximations in this area. Indeed, abuses of
this sort was the reason for the enactment of the contemporaneous record rule.
In practice, taxpayers would simply tell their accountants or other tax return
preparers in broad terms something like "this car is used 100% for business and
that one is 85% business."
Last spring, Congress amended its work of the preceding year to say,
instead of "adequate contemporaneous records," taxpayers could get by on
"adequate records or sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own
statement." Unfortunately, most taxpayers who took an interest in this area
have a conception something like the following: "The IRS wanted to make me
keep a diary showing every time I moved the car, but Congress slapped them
down." In fact, Congress did not change the law on this point as much as most
people think. A taxpayer claiming a deduction (or an exclusion) will still need
either adequate records or sufficient corroborating evidence. While the House
bill would have required written records, the Conferees went along with the
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concept that oral testimony should be considered. However, the Committee
report makes it clear that rather stringent standards are to be applied in this area:
"The conferees believe that oral evidence corroborating
the taxpayer's own statement, such as oral tesimony from
a disinterested, unrelated party describing the taxpayer's
activity may be of sufficient probative value that it should
not be automatically excluded from consideration section
274(d).
The conferees emphasize, however, that different types of
evidence have different degrees of probative value. The
conferees believe that oral evidence alone has con-
siderably less probative value than written evidence. In
addition, the conferees believe that the probative value of
written evidence is greater the closer in time it relates to
the expenditure. Thus, written evidence arising at or near
the time of the expenditure absent unusual circumstances,
has much more probative value than evidence created
years later, such as written evidence first prepared for
audit or court."
Obviously, the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury have no
choice but to draft the regulations along this same line. When Congress went
over the same ground twice in less than a year, it is hard to say that it is unclear
what is intended. As a result, it would appear that an employee desiring an
exclusion under section 132(d) for a working condition fringe will have to meet
the substantiation rules. Moreover, it would appear that a "trip diary" or other
contemporaneous record is still the best evidence on this point.
Finally, it is important to remember that there are a number of
pre-1984 Act ways in which a taxpayer can lose a section 162 deduction (and
hence the section 132 exclusion for working condition fringes). For example,
the provision of office facilities to an employee would not normally give rise to
income, even if they were exceedingly comfortable. The reason for this is that,
if the employee paid for the facilities himself, he would be entitled to a
deduction under either section 162 or 167. But what would be the result if the
office is simply so lavish that a section 162 business deduction would be
questionable. It seems possible that the exclusion, as well as the deduction,
could be lost on this basis. Thus, an office with a lavish bedroom suite, sauna,
hot tub, movie theater, and other non-business luxuries could end up being
taxed to the employee recipient. This result seems even more likely in the case
of a small business, where the owner is the recipient of this luxury.
A possible argument to counteract such an allegation is that, for
some taxpayers, the lavish nature of the facilities in question is an element of
their business necessity. See, for example, International Artists, Ltd. v.
Comm'r., 55 T.C. 94 (1970), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 3, in which the Tax Court held
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that a "lavishly decorated and furnished house provided to noted entertainer
Walter Liberace served such a business purpose; note also, however, that Mr.
Liberace was charged with dividend income for his personal usage of this
house.
C. Non-Discrimination Rules
The exclusions in section 132 for no-additional-cost services, qual-
ified employee discounts, subsidized eating facilities, and qualified tuition
reductions are subject to non-discrimination limitations. These exclusions are
available to an officer, owner, or highly-compensated employee only if the
benefit is available on substantially the same terms to each member of a group
of employees which is defined under a reasonable classification set up by the
employer which does not discriminate in favor of officers, owners or highly-
compensated employees. This limitation assumes major importance in the case
of the typical closely-held business, where the tendency toward discriminatory
compensation arrangements is strongest.
1. Factual Determination
A classification which on its face restricts benefits and makes
them available only to the highly paid group is per se discriminatory.
2. Classifications
A reasonable classification based on appropriate factors (e.g.,
seniority, full-time versus part-time employment or job descriptions) will
suffice if it is nondiscriminatory in effect.
3. Relationship to Other Nondiscrimination Rules
"A determination that a classification is reasonable for purposes
of applying the nondiscrimination rules of [section 132] is not to be taken as an
indication as to whether or not the classification is reasonable for purposes of
applying other nondiscrimination rules in the Code, such as the rules in section
401 (a) (4) for qualified plans." H.R. Rept. No. 98-432 (Part 2), 98th Cong. 2d
Sess., pg. 1606.
4. Practical Applications
The effect of these rules upon traditional fringes will depend
upon individual facts or circumstances, but could be dramatic. For example,
executive dining room facilities are normally designed to be discriminatory;
exclusion of resultant benefit would apparently turn upon whether the employer
can point to a business reason for the restrictions on the use of the facility.
D. Application of Section 162 Principles
As a practical matter, primary reliance for continued exclusion of
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many traditional management perks must be placed on the working condition
fringe rule of section 132(d). While this category of expenditure is free of the
non-discrimination rules described above, it adopts instead a set of rules which
can be every bit as rigorous. Specifically, the exclusion for working condition
fringes is available only if the amount in question would be deductible by the
recipient employee under section 162 as an ordinary and necessary business
expense or under section 167 (depreciation and amortization) if paid for
directly.
Theoretically, this has probably been the effect of present law for
many years. If a given amount is deductible by the recipient, he/she will
generally not care if it is includible. The available deduction will offset the
inclusion, giving the same net effect as an exclusion.
E. Audit Implications
The existence of a new statutory framework for the tax treatment of
fringe benefits, coupled with new rules governing mixed business and personal
use of property, suggests that taxpayers and practitioners may expect increased
audit scrutiny on these issues.
The scope of the changes is such that many owners of closely-held
businesses face a threat to their company-financed lifestyle. Past practices
which can objectively be described as abuses are now more likely to be detected
and challenged on audit.
For example, many taxpayers have a company car which is used in
part for commuting. Relatively few taxpayers in this position accept the notion
that driving from home to their place of business and back is not a business use,
although this has long been true. The Conference Committee Report states that
this is the case even if the car is used to place business telephone calls or hold
business meetings while the taxpayer is commuting. H.R. Rept. No. 98-861,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., pg. 1028.
F. Avoiding Problems
With the new law now in effect, employers who have not already
done so should undertake a thorough review of existing fringe benefit practices
and evaluate whether any restructuring might be desirable. In the long run, it is
likely that a principal effect of section 132 will be to modify employer practices
by conforming available benefits to the categories for which exclusions are
available.
To the extent it is determined a given benefit should be continued
notwithstanding possible adverse tax consequences, other changes may prove
desirable. At a minimum, taxpayers should maintain careful records to docu-
ment the actual extent of any claimed business usage of corporate property.
Now more than ever, any ambiguities or unsubstantiated allegations are likely
to be construed against the taxpayer.
